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War Powers
UNDECLARED WAR: TWILIGHT ZONE OF CONSTITUTIONAL
POWER By Edward Keynes. University Park, Pennsylvania: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1982. Pp. ix, 236. $17.95.

Reviewed by W. Taylor Reveley, III*
Interpreting the constitutional separation of the congressional war
powers from the presidential office of commander in chief is a
difficult art that requires the skills of a historian, constitutional
lawyer, political scientist, social psychologist, and the Oracle of
Apollo at Delphi. (P. 31)
Dr. Keynes captures the essence nicely. For nearly two centuries the war
powers have bedeviled a host of Presidents, congressmen, and those few
judges willing to deal with them in court. The constitutional division of the
war powers between the executive and legislative branches remains unclear
today. Many hold beliefs nurtured by events since 1789-those of the Cold
War in particular-that the Constitution vests in the President a broad prerogative over American war and peace. For many others, like Keynes, the Indochina conflict reawakened belief in a dominant congressional role, well rooted
in the constitutional text and in the debates of its Framers and Ratifiers. As a
result, interested Americans have disagreed vigorously in recent years about
the constitutionality of various presidential and congressional approaches to
the use of force.
Since government began under the Constitution, struggles over the war
powers have erupted constantly between the President and Congress. By 1815
the United States had fought an array of Indians (in effect, foreign enemies);
the two greatest powers of the day, France and Britain; and the Barbary ,
States. In addition, the Republic had skirted hostilities with Spain while
pressing to relieve her of Florida. Thus, the respective constitutional prerogatives of the President and Congress over war and peace were of great concern
to Americans while Washington, John Adams, and Madison held office. And
there have been few administrations in which the nature of these prerogatives
has not been heatedly debated.
Nonetheless, the search for a satisfactory theory of the war powers has
been more intense and fruitful ~ince the United States entered the Indochina

• Member of the Virginia and District of Columbia Bars. A.B. 1965, Princeton; J.D. 1968,
University of Virginia. Mr. Reveley spent 1972-73 studying the war powers as a fellow of the
Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars in Washington, D.C. and an international
affairs fellow of the Council on Foreign Relations in New York City. He is the author of War
Powers of the President and Congress: Who Holds the Arrows and Olive Branch? (1981).
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conflict than at any prior time. 1 Given the experience of the past generation
with American involvement abroad and prior experience with isolation and
nonintervention, we do seem closer now than ever before to a mature understanding of how to divide authority between the President and Congress over
war and peace. Keynes's book joins this quest. 2
l. THE ELEMENTS OF A SATISFACTORY THEORY OF THE WAR POWERS

A satisfactory theory of the war powers must successfully unite (1) the
text of the Constitution's war-power provisions, (2) the purposes of those who
wrote and ratified the text in 1787-1788, (3) the evolving beliefs of Americans
since 1789 about what the Constitution requires, and (4) the various allocations of control over the war powers that have existed in fact between the
President and Congress during the past two centuries; Text and purpose are
reasonably straightforward guides for constitutional interpretation. The
evolving beliefs about the requirements of the Constitution and actual allocations of power are more convoluted; together they make up what is generally
termed "practice," or "usage." 3 Practice has been shaped not only by the
1. Keynes characterized Vietnam as the first modern undeclared conflict to test the President's warmaking powers. He suggests that the President's use of troops in the Korean War was
pursuant to the United Nations Charter, which has the force of law in the United States.
Furthermore, notes Keynes, World War 11 did not technically terminate until Aprill952 so that
the initial deployment of troops was valid under war-time statutes (p. Ill).
While Indochina far more than Korea did provide an occasion for constitutional testing,
Keynes's explanation for this phenomenon is not compelling. Given the Tonkin Gulf Resolution
of 1964, a strong case can be made that American involvement in Indochina, unlike Korea, was
expressly authorized by Congress until the resolution's repeal in 1971. The reason that Indochina
but not Korea provoked such constitutional testing, accordingly, is not immediately obvious.
Perhaps the main reason lies in the respective lengths of the two conflicts. Had the Indochina War
ended as quickly as the Korean War (say, by 1968), it too would not have been the object of such
constitutional uproar. Further, unlike Korea, Indochina arose when, as a result of the civil rights
movement, the country had become accustomed to constitutional confrontations. That movement
rose in force only after Korea ended and peaked just as Indochina was getting well underway,
releasing much of its energy to matters of war and peace.
2. The Indochina conflict unleashed a flood of opinion, scholarship and action on the war
powers-in law reviews, books, and the media; in proposed and actual legislation of many sorts,
as well as voluminous congressional hearings; in publications of the executive branch; in the
verbal positions taken by Presidents and Congressmen on pertinent issues; and, in judicial
decisions. Among the ensuing books were T. Eagleton, War and Presidential Power: A Chronicle
of Congressional Surrender (1974); L. Henkin, Foreign Affairs and the Constitution (1972); J.
Javits, Who Makes War: The President Versus Congress (1973); W. Reveley, War Powers of the
President and Congress: Who Holds the Arrows and Olive Branch? (1981); A. Schlesinger, Jr.,
The Imperial Presidency (1973); A. Sofaer, War, Foreign Affairs and Constitutional Power: The
Origins (1976); L. Velvel, Undeclared War and Civil Disobedience: The American System in
Crisis (1970). The books unleashed by Indochina continue to emerge. See, e.g., J. Sullivan, The
War Powers Resolution: A Special Study of the Committee on Foreign Affairs (1982); A. Thomas
& A. Thomas, Jr., The War-Making Powers of the President (1982).
3. Constitutional fundamentalists, of course, say that practice has no legitimate role in
constitutional interpretation. It is certainly true that the actual language of the Constitution and,
to a lesser extent, the evidence of the Framers' and Ratifiers' purposes for adopting particular
provisions, are the primary determinants of what the Constitution means. The actual language of
the document has unique standing. Its words alone have been formally drafted and ratified as
constitutional law-a status not shared by the Framers' and Ratifiers' comments or by any aspect
of subsequent practice, Supreme Court decisions included. It follows that when the war-power
provisions of the document do explicitly allocate control between the two branches, the allocation
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constitutional text and debates, but also by three additional factors: the
hazard, pace, and complexity of America's international relations at any
particular time; the respective institutional capabilities of the President and
Congress to cope with these changing relations; and the shifting balance of
political strength between the two branches.
_
All of these factors have contributed to the allocation of the war powers
between the President and Congress. More important, they will all continue to
contribute, barring a radical change in American habits. This does not doom
us to wander amid constitutional confusion, obtaining firm direction only
from the prevailing political winds. It does suggest that successful constitutional answers must take into account all of the factors: the historical and
political, as well as the purely legal.
To what extent does Undeclared War further the quest for a satisfactory
theory of the war powers? Keynes discusses only in passing the text of many of
the Constitution's war-power provisions and the implications that may be
drawn from them. He sketches more fully the purposes of the Framers-if not
the Ratifiers-by usefully setting out the "philosophical milieu" that shaped
the conclusions of the Framers in 1787. The focus of Keynes's book, however,
is on one aspect of post-1789 practice: the role of the courts in defining-or
declining to define-the respective war powers of the President and Congress.
Keynes's treatment of pertinent judicial decisions, especially those spawned by
the Indochina conflict, is among the most complete now available.
The nonjudicial aspects of war-power practice, including the history of
relations between Congress and the Executive Branch, are largely ignored in
Undeclared War. Their disregard is serious because, as Keynes laments,
judges have been loathe to take cases involving the war powers. Thus, these
powers have largely been shaped over the past two centuries by the beliefs and

must be honored. Accordingly, none doubt that Congress must vote to declare war if America is
to declare it. But in most cases, the demands of the Constitution must be interpreted from sources
other than the words themselves. We must look beyond the text to decide, for example, which if
any hostilities require a declaration of war.
Evidence of the Framers' and Ratifiers' purposes has the first claim to shape whatever
meaning is given to uncertainties in the Constitution's provisions. But while the deliberations of
1787-1788 are entitled to deference, they should not mesmerize us. As the Framers of the
Constitution were aware, much of their debate reflected problems peculiar to America at that
time. See infra notes 12-13. They and others of their generation tend to interpret the Constitution
by reading its text in light of experience and the document's underlying principles rather than in
terms of the minutiae of their deliberations.
Moreover, the constitutional text has successfully been interpreted in ways contrary to the
apparent intentions of its Framers and Ratifiers, even during its early years. For example, a
strikingly greater diplomatic role for the Senate was assumed in the 1787-1790 conventions than
actually developed during the first generation under the Constitution. It is inescapable that beliefs
about what the Constitution's war-power provisions require, as well as the nature of actual
allocations of control, have evolved over the past two centuries. It is not true that their evolution
has simply been a descent into unconstitutionality. Rather, since 1789 the country has struggled to
give concrete meaning to the Constitution's abstract terms, mark the bounds of its competing
grants of authority, and fill in its gaps. Along the way we have frequently replaced old expectations about the law and old divisions of raw power with new understandings and arrangements
more responsive to the changing circumstances of the country. In short, practice since 1789 does
have a role in constitutional interpretation. See generally W. Reveley, supra note 2, at 170-75.
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actions of Presidents, members of Congress, Secretaries of State and War (or
Defense), other bureaucrats, military and diplomatic officers, and commentators.
The most serious consequence of Keynes's limited, judicial focus is his
failure to discuss the only statute purporting to allocate the war powers
between the President and Congress: the War Powers Resolution of 1973. 4
The Resolution resulted from a decade of constitutional dispute between the
legislative and executive branches, spurred by an explosion in war-power
debate and scholarship. As noted below, the Resolution will very likely prove
to be the most significant single influence on the development of the war
powers since the adoption of the Constitution itself.
II.

KEYNEs's ARGUMENT

There are three basic elements to Keynes's argument in Undeclared War.
First, he suggests that, while the text of the Constitution and its Framers'
purposes require prior congressional approval for any offensive use of American arms, leaving defensive uses to the President's discretion, in modern times
the offensive/defensive dichotomy no longer provides a realistic basis for
dividing the war powers between the President and Congress. Second, to the
extent courts have been willing to do anything at all about the growing
executive hegemony over the war powers, judges have usually made the
situation worse by creating a "twilight zone of concurrent power" (p. 166). 5
In cases falling within this zone, courts have read imprecise congressional
acts-often passed in the wake of executive faits accomplis-as having approved offensive as well as defensive use of force by the President. Third,
while courts may be expected to play a limited role in restraining offensive use
of force by Presidents-perhaps a greater role after Indochina than before-it
remains for Congress to limit executive war-making by insisting on a prior
consensus between the executive and the legislative branches about American
use of force abroad. Each of these elements bears scrutiny.
A. The Offensive/Defensive Dichotomy

As to the first element, Keynes concludes that the Framers gave the
commander-in-chief power to the President on the assumption that the President and Congress will perform two separate functions with regard to military
activities. Congress can change the nation's condition from peace to war. The
President, on the other hand, can repel sudden attacks-be they on U.S.
territory or on armed forces abroad-in his capacity as civilian commander in
chief. The President may also use the armed forces to protect the lives and
property of United States citizens abroad (p. 34). Keynes suggests that by

4. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1541-1548 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
5. Cf. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
concurring) ("there is a zone of twilight in which [the President! and Congress may have
concurrent authority").
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giving "defensive" powers to the President, it was intended that his authority
in this domain be exclusive. "While Congress has broad power to curb
presidential warmaking, the legislature cannot constitutionally limit the President's defensive power" (p. 165).
In all likelihood, however, Keynes has overstated the discretion that the
Framers and Ratifiers intended for the President. The "fundamental distinction between offensive and defensive war and hostilities" (p. 34), on which
Keynes relies is largely a construct of post-1789 practice, not of the original
understanding. Far more than the Framers and Ratifiers, it is post-1789 usage
that suggests the President "has the exclusive constitutional authority to
defend U.S. citizens, territory, troops, and property against sudden attack or
when the threat of attack is imminent" (p. 88). Neither the 1787-1788 debates
nor the text of the Constitution itself reveals such sweeping executive prerogative.
The debates do indicate that the Framers envisaged the use of armed
force without a formal declaration of war, but not, unless the nation were
suddenly attacked, without prior authorization by majority vote of the House
and Senate. The Framers and Ratifiers understood the distinction between
limited use of armed force in discrete contexts and unrestricted general hostilities, and intended to provide for both contingencies in the Constitution. They
were aware that most eighteenth-century conflicts had not been formally
declared and that political theorists distinguished between general and limited
conflict, with marque and reprisal explicitly recognized as a means of waging
the latter. Defensive or retaliatory uses of force, the sorts expected for America in 1787-1788, tended in that era to be limited, undeclared engagements. In
addition, the word "declare" was loosely employed by the Framers in ways
equating it with "begin" or "authorize." Use of the term suggests that the
Framers expected a more active role for Congress than Keynes recognizes. The
Framers' grant of authority to Congress to declare war and issue letters of
marque and reprisal almost certainly was intended to convey control over all
involvement of American forces in combat whether for defensive or offensive
purposes, except in response to sudden attack. 6
Even then, the text of the Constitution suggests that the Framers expected
the states to bear the major burden of defense against sudden attack until
Congress could act. 7 The only evidence of equivalent authority for the President must be gleaned from a brief, confused Philadelphia debate-less than
two pages in Madison's notes-which ended with the substitution of "declare" for "make" in the clause delineating Congress's war power. 8 The
discussion meandered and the nature of crucial votes remains obscure; but it is

6. See generally W. Reveley, supra note 2, at 51-ll5.
7. Although the states may engage "without the Consent of Congress ... in War •.. [if]
actually invaded, or in such imminent Danger as will not admit of delay," U.S. Canst. art. I, § 10,
cl.3, there is no equivalent constitutional provision authorizing presidential response to either
ongoing or imminent attack.
8. See 2 Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, at 318 (M. Farrand ed. 19ll); see also
W. Reveley, supra note 2, at 64, 81-85, 101-02.
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not likely that the substitution signaled much gain in executive prerogative in
the minds of the Framers. George Mason voted for the substitution despite his
phobia about presidential power, and the change later was ratified without
objection by any of the most virulent foes of executive power.
The substitution may have been designed simply to prevent Congress
from asserting control over the conduct, as well as the initiation, of conflict.
Even if, as seems more probable, the change was intended to authorize
emergency military action by the President, no mention was made of any
power on his part to defend the nation against imminent as opposed to
ongoing attack, much less of power to defend anything abroad-such as U.S.
citizens and property in other countries. Thus, in the light most favorable to
presidential prerogative, the Framers' substitution of "declare" for "make"
permits executive response to ongoing physical attack on American territory
and may also allow preemptive strikes by the President against impending
attack, until Congress can decide whether to pursue the hostilities.
The commander-in-chief clause, in turn, received little attention from the
Framers and Ratifiers. 9 It was viewed as a modest grant of authority. Hamilton's limited "first general and admiral" interpretation reflected the consensus.10 During hostilities the President would set strategy and tactics, and his
authority would inevitably grow during a military crisis. But he would not
commit America to hostilities except by signing authorizing legislation, and he
would not make peace except as a participant with the Senate in the treaty
process. Those who fought the commander-in-chief clause did so out of fear
that the President would turn the army to treason at home. The Federalists
responded by citing the need for a single commander during war (a lesson
learned from the Revolution) and the danger of placing it in an ambitious
general rather than a civil officer with a fixed tenure. They said that only the
rare President would personally command the troops, and that there would be
no armies, navies, or militia for him to lead unless Congress so provided. No
one suggested that the President would have an unlimited prerogative to use
foree so long as it was used for defensive ends. The declare-war and commander-in-chief clauses passed with little debate because they left Congress
with authority over whether the American military would be used. Other than
the President's participation in legislating military policy, his only role was to
execute it.
Having found an offensive/defensive dichotomy in the original understanding, Keynes then argues that the twentieth century has undone it.
Changes in the technology of warfare, he notes, have eliminated any coherent
distinction between the "offensive" and "defensive" use of military force. He
cites as examples the deployment of U.S. intermediate range missiles in Turkey and the stationing of Soviet combat troops in Cuba. Should these be
considered offensive or defensive measures? For that matter, he asks, is a
preemptive nuclear first strike a defensive or an offensive act (p. 3)? 11
9. See W. Reveley, supra note 2, at 64-65, 75, 77, 80, 82-84, 88-90, 97, 100, 102-06.
10. The Federalist No. 69, at 418 (A. Hamilton) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961).
11. See also pp. 40, 88-89.
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But for reasons already noted, the distinction between offensive and
defensive uses of force did not figure heavily in how the Framers and Ratifiers
anticipated the war powers would be divided between Congress and the President. The source of the constitutional tension between the executive and
legislative branches over the war powers lies not in the dawn of a new era, as
Keynes maintains. Rather, the difficulty in developing a satisfactory theory of
the war powers arose when the Framers' and Ratifiers' basic expectationthat there would be prior congressional approval of all American use of force
except under the very limited circumstances of sudden attack-proved to be
unrealistic almost from the moment government began under the Constitution.12 President Washington with the Indians, Jefferson with the Barbary
States, Madison and Monroe as they sought to take Florida from Spain, Polk
in pursuing manifest destiny at Mexico's expense, and Lincoln blockading and
raising troops against the South-in fact almost all Presidents from 1789 onhave used force offensively, as well as defensively, without prior congressional
approval.
Nor was the line between defensive and offensive action much more easily
drawn in the nineteenth century than today. In each of the instances just
mentioned, Americans disagreed about where to mark the boundary, just as
they now differ over how to categorize "deployment of U.S. intermediaterange missiles in Turkey or the stationing of Soviet combat troops in Cuba"
(p. 3).13
12. The Framers' unrealistic view of prior approval fits within a larger context of related but
equally ephemeral views: that peace and noninvolvement with the rest of the world would be
America's customary condition; that the hazard, pace, and complexity of international affairs
would remain as they were in 1787-1788, along with the country's virtually nonexistent capacity
and need to work its will abroad; that treaties would prove to be the heart of American foreign
relations; that the Senate could keep step with the President in diplomacy; that the regular
military would not achieve its present size and stand during peace, little restrained by the need for
Congress to raise and support it; and that the loyalty of naturalized citizens, the navigation of the
Mississippi, and other compelling issues of the late eighteenth century would be indicative of the
country's enduring security concerns.
13. But while the war powers do not raise new constitutional issues today, they do present
issues of wholly new dimensions that-because of the changes in the international system and the
conduct of warfare to which Keynes refers-have unprecedented gravity.
During the first generation under the Constitution, the country suffered the trials of a small,
weak nation caught up, if at a distance, in the wars of the prevailing superpowers. The country,
nonetheless, was shielded by geography, the limited military technology of its potential foes, the
inability of America to intervene abroad, and its slight economic interdependence with other
nations. During most of the nineteenth century, America was even further sheltered by the rise of
a European balance of power for which it had no direct responsibility.
During the last three decades, the circumstances have changed. The purely physical ability of
postwar America to commit its military abroad in large or small numbers, swiftly or slowly, for
days or years, vastly exceeds the country's capacity before 1941. America's willingness to intervene abroad also stands in radical contrast to a previous tradition of nouinvolvement except to
trade, defend American citizens and property abroad, expand our boundaries, and police the
Caribbean. Coupled with this new capacity and will to use force abroad are consequences of
intervention that defy prediction and risk catastrophe more than ever before. Even the time when
weak states could be roughly handled with little risk of violating international law and political
sensibilities has passed. The American military can no longer punish with relative impunity
"backward" peoples who have attacked our citizens and property, or pursue criminals across the
borders of weak states, or occupy and administer Caribbean countries. See W. Reveley, supra
note 2, at 12-13, 165-66, 177, 184-85, 265, 348 n.66.
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B. Judicial Failure to Police the War Powers
The second major theme of Keynes's argument is that the judiciary's
treatment of the war powers has served only to confuse and distort the basic
issues. Especially since the Civil War, according to Keynes, the judiciary has
allowed Congress and the President to fuse their constitutionally distinct
authority into a single war power. That power, in turn, has been exercised by
the commander in chief with few limitations. This situation has evolved under
a theory of "joint participation," developed by judges and commentators,
which, Keynes says, unjustifiably allows Congress to transfer power to initiate
military hostilities to the President. 14
Keynes is correct that the courts have done a poor job of policing the war
powers. Usually they have declined to take the job at all. When judges have
acted, often they have wrung congressional approval for presidential initiatives out of legislative activity, or inactivity, that fell far short of express
authorization of American use of force (pp. 101-09, 120-60). 15
Nonetheless, the result does not deserve Keynes's grim judgment that
"the judiciary has encouraged the legislature and the executive to fuse their
separate powers of war and defense into a national war power whose only
standard is the extraconstitutional one of success on the battlefield" (p. 167).
First, the judiciary has had relatively little to do with the process. Second,
those people and institutions that have been heavily involved in it have not
done nearly the bad job that Keynes suggests. The "practice of presidential
military fait accompli" (p. 167) did not begin, as Keynes argues, with the Civil
War (although no prior or subsequent President has matched Lincoln's unilateral acts in 1861). 16 Starting with George Washington, Presidents began using
the military on their own initiative, some more than others and with varying
degrees of congressional ratification. 17 As stated previously, the Framers' and
Ratifiers' expectation that Congress would authorize in advance all use of
force by this country, except in response to sudden attack, proved unrealistic
from the outset.
Thus, the country has been working since 1789 toward a satisfactory
theory of the war powers. The process has not simply involved Congress, the
courts, and the public supine before rising presidential prerogative over American war and peace. 18 The legislators have been the driving influence behind
certain decisions to fight. Some Presidents have sought prior congressional
approval, been denied it, and foresworn armed action. 19 On other occasions
executives or their subordinates have begun a use of force only to end it when
14. "Congress cannot prospectively or retroactively authorize the President to choose the
enemy, the time and the place of military hostilities" (p. 167).
15. See also W. Reveley, supra note 1, at 11, 140, 148-49, 212-15, 345-46 nn.33-34.
16. 1n the early months of his Presidency, Lincoln increased the size of the Army and the
Navy, called out the militia, summoned volunteers, paid money from the Treasury to private
parties to further the war effort, and blockaded confederate ports-all while Congress was out of
session. When Congress finally met, it ratified the President's actions. Id. at 125-26.
17. See id. at 121-30, 135-61.
18. See id. at 121-31.
19. ld. at 121.
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Congress refused to vote ratification or vital implementing tools. 20 On yet
other occasions Presidents have been permitted to go forward subject to
congressional constraints, for instance, as to geography or type of force. 21
Presidents, too, have at times declined even to attempt military acton in the
face of anticipated congressional opposition. 22 Far more often, of course,
majorities in the Senate and House have affirmatively agreed with the President on how force should be used; sometimes the resulting congressional
acceptance of executive policy has been the product of genuine interchange
between the two branches, and sometimes Congress has acquiesced in presidential initiatives. 23 Then, too, some presidential actions, if ever blessed by
Congress, were blessed because the circumstances left no other acceptable
option. 24
Various constitutional standards can be drawn from the interplay that
has occurred since 1789. The precise nature of these standards-their definition of a satisfactory theory of the war powers-remains a matter of disagreement among reasonable people. But the state of the art has advanced significantly in recent years, and there is reason to believe that the outline of an
emerging constitutional consensus was drawn in the War Powers Resolution
of 197325 despite presidential objection to certain of its terms. That incipient
consensus, stated in broad terms that do not necessarily mirror those of the
Resolution, (1) leaves to the President the discretion to begin military action
that he thinks in the national interest, so long as he promptly reports the use
of force to Congress, but thereafter (2) requires express congressional authorization to continue the military action beyond a few months, and (3) urges the
President at all times to consult closely with Congress on matters of war and
peace. 26 Element (1) takes most of its constitutional justification from practice
since 1789, while elements (2) and (3) are more directly drawn from the actual
language of the Constitution and the expectations of its Framers and Ratifiers.
C. Proposed Congressional Role

Against this background comes the last of Keynes's central themes. He
concludes that since the judiciary has proved to be particularly tolerant of the
20. Id. at 122.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 122-23.
23. Id. at 124.
24. See supra note 16.
25. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1541-1548 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
26. Arguably, there is a fourth element as well: an understanding that majorities in the
Senate and House, via a concurrent resolution, may vote limits on, or an end to, a presidential
military initiative at any time during its conduct. The legal force of such a "legislative veto" is
doubtful, however, after the Supreme Court's holdings that such vetoes in other contexts are
unconstitutional. See INS v. Chadha, 103 S. Ct. 2764 (1983); Process Gas Consumers Group v.
Consumers Energy Council of America, 103 S. Ct. 3556 (mem}, aff'g Consumer Energy Council
of America v. FERC, 673 F.2d 425 (D.C. Cir. 1982); United States Senate v. FTC, 103 S. Ct. 3556
(1983) (mem}, aff'g Consumers Union of U.S., Inc. v. FTC, 691 F.2d 575 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
Dissenting in Chadha, Justice White warned: "Today the Court not only invalidates § 244(c)(2) of
the Immigration and Nationality Act, but also sounds the death knell for nearly 200 other
statutory provisions in which Congress has reserved a 'legislative veto.'" 103 S. Ct. at 2792.
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exercise of executive power, opponents of presidential warmaking must look
to Congress for relief (p. 175). He suggests, however, that "the concept of an
indivisible national war power permits the President to suspend the separation
of powers as long as Congress concurs in his decisions" (p. 169). Yet if
Congress loses confidence in the President's military policy, Keynes fears that
it will have to "mobilize a two-thirds majority to override the commander in
chief's actions" (id.). Failing that, Congress's only other remedy is impeachment and removal (p. 170).
Keynes is concerned that Congress may not be equal to the task. His
concern, however, largely ignores the War Powers Resolution of 1973. He
mentions it only twice in the last pages of his book. 27 Yet the act appears to be
directly on point. In unprecedented fashion, it sets out procedures for how the
President and legislators are to go about deciding whether to use force, and it
constitutes the best chance Congress has had since 1789 for guaranteed opportunities to participate in deciding whether America uses force if the combat
lasts more than forty-eight hours. Thus, though largely overlooked by Keynes,
the Resolution accomplishes many of the goals he endorses. It does permit
"opponents of presidential warmaking" to focus realistically "on Congress
rather than the Federal courts" (p. 175). While the act does not deny the
President quick, surgical applications of armed force, it makes clear, as
Keynes strongly urges, that "explicit legislative authorization" is required for
any long-term commitment of American forces to hostilities, thus assuring
that "the nation [wiii] not wage a long, protracted, undeclared war without
fundamental prior agreement between Congress and the President" (p. 175).
It also avoids the possibility that Congress must mobilize a two-thirds majority to override the commander in chief's actions (p. 169). Under the Resolution, an executive initiative ends (a) within sixty to ninety days unless a
majority of Congress votes expressly to authorize its continuance, or (b) at
any other time that Congress legislatively vetoes the initiative.28
Admittedly, however, the Supreme Court's decision last Term in INS v.
Chadha29 cast serious doubt on the constitutionality of all legislative vetoes,
including the one created by section 5(c) of the War Powers Resolution:

27. In the first passage (p.171), Keynes implies that a case involving the war powers might
arise outside the context of the Resolution. That is unlikely given its structure: the President must
report to Congress his use of force within 48 hours of its initiation, and he must then (a) end the
usc within 60 to 90 days unless Congress expressly authorizes its continuance, or (b) limit or end it
whenever so directed by majority votes in the House and Senate. But sec supra note 26.
Keynes's fear that courts might find "some procedural rationale" for refusing to hear the
case (p. 173) seems unwarranted. If asked, courts will probably construe the constitutionality of
the War Powers Resolution and, assuming it has been found constitutional, then decide whether
there has or.has not been compliance with its pertinent provisions. Federal courts are not prone to
avoid cases brought squarely under federal statutes. They have also become somewhat more
willing in recent years to consider cases involving the basic prerogatives of the President and
Congress. See, e.g., United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 703-05 (1974); see also W. Rcvclcy,
supra note 2, at 209-12, 216-17, 242, 262.
28. But see supra note 26; infra text accompanying notes 29-30.
29. 103 S. Ct. 2764 (1983).
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[A]t any time that United States Armed Forces are engaged in
hostilities outside the territory of the United States ... without a
declaration of war or specific statutory authorization, such forces
shall be removed by the President if the Congress so directs by
concurrent resolution. 30
It follows that section 5(c) probably would not survive a dose of Chadha's

rationale.
On the other hand, it is interesting to speculate what the Court might
have done had the constitutionality of a legislative veto first been questioned
in the context of the War Powers Resolution. Viscerally, the Chadha facts
were especially compelling-a twelfth-hour, drumhead vote by one house of
Congress to expel a benign alien from this country, despite the executive
branch's protestations that he deserved to stay. 31 These facts invited the
discovery of constitutional flaws in the expulsion procedure. Quite to the
contrary, a likely set of war-power facts would place Congress, not the
President, in the more sympathetic light; a typical war-power context would
involve a considered vote by both houses of Congress to limit or stop use of
American armed force abroad, one begun by the President acting solely on his
own authority.
Moreover, Justices White, Powell and Rehnquist took varied but serious
exception to the Chadha majority's reasoning. The arguments of these three
Justices-plus the absence in Chadha of any explicit indication that the majority meant to overturn section 5(c) of the War Powers Resolution-could
provide the basis for the Court some years hence to sustain a legislative veto in
the war-power context. 32
In any event, Congress will very likely keep section 5(c) on the books to
use if the need arises. At worst, the result will be a quick judicial ruling that
Chadha did kill section 5(c). But even if the Court so ruled, it would remain
likely as a practical matter that majorities in both houses who are willing to try
to end an executive military action by using section 5(c) will also be willing to
curb the executive branch by other means as well, for example, by condition-

30. 50 U.S.C. § 1544(c) (Supp. V 1981).
31. See Chadha, 103 S. Ct. at 2770-72. But it should be noted that the Court has summarily
affirmed cases striking down legislative vetoes in less viscerally troublesome cases. See supra note
26.
32. "Perhaps I am wrong," wrote Justice White, "and the Court remains open to consider
whether certain forms of the legislative veto are reconcilable with the Article I requirements."
Chadha, 103 S. Ct. at 2796 n.ll (White, J., dissenting). The two most significant figures in the
passage of the War Powers Resolution, former Senator Javits and Congressman Zablocki, feel
that the act has not been severely harmed by Chadha, if at all. See 129 Cong. Rec. S10680 (daily
ed. July 22, 1983) (article by Sen. Javits); id. at E3166 (daily ed. June 23, 1983) (remarks of Rep.
Zablocki).
On the other hand, Congress's claim to set American policy on aliens is exceptionally strong.
See Chadha, 103 S. Ct. at 2804-06 (White, J., dissenting). Congress, with executive aquiescence,
has historically exercised far more control over aliens than over the use of our military abroad. It
may follow that, if a legislative veto is unconstitutional in so clear an area of congressional
prerogative as the treatment of aliens, then such a veto would be even more suspect in the more
ambiguous area of congressional prerogative over U.S. military intervention abroad.
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ing or denying military appropriations, 33 selective service acts and the like, or
even by threatening to impeach the Chief Executive. As a glue for holding
such majorities together and as a spur for them to restrain the President by
cutting appropriations, it would be hard to find anything more effective than
a presidential refusal to honor a concurrent resolution passed under section
5(c). His disregard of the sentiment so expressed by both houses, and the
implicit challenge to congressional authority, would very likely have a galvanizing effect.
Further, even though section 5(c) may not survive Chadha, the rest of the
War Powers Resolution almost surely does since section 9 of the Resolution
expressly provides for severability. 34 The remaining elements of the Resolution
include section 3's presidential consultation obligations, section 4's presidential reporting duties, and section 5(b)'s provision for ending any executive use
of force within sixty to ninety days unless approved by Congress prior to the
deadline. Provisions expediting congressional consideration of war-power issues also remain largely unaffected. These sections constitute by themselveswholly without the legislative veto-an assertion of congressional control over
American war and peace unprecedented since the framing and ratifying of the
Constitution; they provide a powerful vehicle for congressional involvement
in shaping American policy. In sum, the War Powers Resolution remains alive
and well after Chadha.
Just as before Chadha, however, the extent to which the Resolution
actually results in heightened congressional involvement in American decisions to use force abroad will depend largely on congressional willingness to
use the Resolution's procedures and then encourage the President-quite
vigorously at times-to do so as well. Having enacted the Resolution over
President Nixon's veto and despite his insistence that it was unconstitutional
in part, Congress has since done little to persuade Presidents to do more than
meet the act's minimal reporting requirements. Its consultation requirements
in particular have gone unobserved, and Congress lost a singular opportunity
in April 1975 to give the Resolution substance when the legislators, despite
President Ford's invitation, failed to participate in shaping the Saigon evacuation.35
Nonetheless, Presidents Ford, Carter, and Reagan have all reported to
Congress under the Resolution. It has been on the books for ten years and has
gained the stature that age provides. Sometimes, as here, particular relations
between Congress and the President can be altered by legislative fiat, responsive to beliefs about what the Constitution requires. These relations can then
shape the future play of politics. Through war-power legislation the President

33. Congress forced an end to American involvement in the Indochina War in this fashion.
See W. Reveley, supra note 2, at 122, 226.
34. 50 U.S.C. § 1548 (1976). The statute in Chadha was also found severable. 103 S. Ct. at
2774-76. But see the severability views of Justices White and Rehnquist, 103 S. Ct. at 2798 n.16
(White, J., dissenting), 2816-17 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
35. See W. Reveley, supra note 2, at 250-53, 261-62.

1983]

WAR POWERS

2~29

has been encouraged to inform Congress in detail of his initiatives for war or
peace. The legislators have been similarly encouraged to state their views
because the act provides them with unavoidable occasions for so doing. And
both branches may well be driven to build broader collaborative bridges to
one another by the executive's need to report and Congress's need to assume
responsibility.
On September 29, 1983, for the fir.st time since the War Powers Resolution became law, Congress actually invoked it, authorizing the continuation
of the President's use of armed force in Lebanon, but imposing an eighteenmonth deadline on the action. 36 Though questioning the authority of Congress
to limit the commander in chief, President Reagan signed the legislation. 37
Ill.

CONCLUSION

Keynes's Undeclared War has contributed to this country's continuing
search for a satisfactory theory of the war powers. Its contribution is greatest
in Keynes's review of the role of the courts in developing these powers. The
book's contribution could have been greater, however, had it considered more
thoroughly the nonjudicial aspects of that development. These aspects dominate and, among them, the War Powers Resolution of 1973 is now particularly
telling.
36. I29 Cong. Rec. 7724-27 (daily ed. Sept. 29, I983). See generally N.Y. Times, Sept. 30,
I983, at AI, col. 6.
37. N.Y. Times, Oct. 13, I983, at AI, col. 1.

